October 15, 2007
Reading and viewing Western print and satellite TV and their Southeast counterparts recently, it’s hard to believe that there is deep understanding about the historical, cultural and economic context of what these media call present day Myanmar and Pakistan.
The staple line of argument among liberal media circles in the West is that the “military junta” or “military regime” in Myanmar and Pakistan need to be changed into liberal democracies along the lines of what politicians, legislators and media pundits in America and Britain seemed to be obsessed with. The illusion that Aung San Suu Kyi, Benazir Bhutto and/or Nawaz Sharif and their coterie of politicos/lawyers are able to devise a alternative, competent and unifying “democratic”political system remains a strong and, at the same time, naive and dangerous one.
Some 8 years ago, at the residence of the British ambassador in Jakarta, I was invited to meet for tea with Michael Aris, husband of Aung San Suu Kyi. I asked him pointedly whether the National League for Democracy which his wife headed was really a viable political organization that could galvanise a sense of national purpose among Myanmar’s civic society, particularly among Shans, Karens, Kachens and other minorities. His answer was so carefully guarded that I did not press the point. I had earlier remarked to him that (then) Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri was still grappling with forging unity within her PDIP party. In other words, for the NLD and PDIP there were limits to riding on the on the charisma of Aung San and Soekarno, to which both Syuu Kyi’s and Megawat relied upon for their influence and legitimacy.
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June 16, 2007
I have been asked to address the issue of the topic presented at the launch of the Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation among Civilizations: Clash of Civilizations: Real or Imagined? I have come to the conclusion that the clash is both real as well as imagined, simply because “facts” or reality are often inseparable from perceptions “imagined”. The more so because much of the debate has been exacerbated and distorted through media.
Western media have used such variants of expressions ranging from “Islamic fundamentalism”, “Islamic terrorism”, “Islamic Jihadists”, and even “Islamic Fascists”. Toxic television, rabble ras well as trash tabloids are prone to use these caricatures. They feed on one another in ways “fact” becomes fiction, and fiction “ ignites” facts.
The Muslim world as a whole has suffered from this massive media manipulation. It has given rise to many different set of perceptions about “clashes within civilizations,” including among Muslims in the Middle East, Asia and Southeast Asia. You can also say that it is a clash of ideas about civilizations across all continents.
The “Clash of Civilizations” was first publicly raised in 1993 in an article written in Foreign Affairs magazine by Professor Samuel Huntington , and it is useful to remind ourselves of the context of when and why the question of clash of civilizations was brought up at the time.
First, it appeared in the wake of the “victory” of liberal capitalism over communism symbolized by the unification of two Germanies in October and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December. Earlier, the January 1991 Gulf War over Kuwait added the sense of western triumphalism. American hegemonism was at its peak.
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December 25, 2006
American policy makers are debating the merits of the Congress-mandated Baker-Hamilton Report of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) announced almost three weeks ago. The gist of the ISG report calls for an American military withdrawal within 18 months, well before the US presidential elections in November 2008. President Bush has rejected the ISG recommendation for a “graceful interval” of US forces pull out of Iraq, implying that the US will remain in Iraq until “the forces of freedom” triumph there.
At the same time, the Pentagon is wrapping up its own Iraq Review. The Pentagon review, led by Chairman of the Joint-Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace and prepared by three American colonels (two army and one marine) with experience on the ground in various insurgency-afflicted countries, provides a much more “ground level” military approach to the American military role in Iraq. The three options mentioned___ Go Big, Go Long and Go Home aims to boost US troop presence by 20.000 personnel, stave off sectarian violence and support Iraq to build a government of “national reconciliation”. There is no mention of a timetable for American withdrawal, though Defense Secretary Robert Gates has acknowledged that America “cannot win in Iraq.” However, there seems to be speculation that a “Go Long” strategy means “a surge” of American troop increase ("Go Big"), will eventually lead to a "Go Home" scenario.
In essence, American policymakers are reviewing the role of US military forces abroad, realizing that superior military technology has limits over essentially social and political problems on the ground. The paradox of American military power seems to be that the more overwhelming its military presence the less influential it becomes on matters pertaining to the local social and cultural situation on the ground. This is true of Afghanistan and even more pertinent to the situation in present day Iraq.
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November 20, 2006
In light of President Bush's current visit to Indonesia. "Military Cooperation Grows as U.S. Concerns on Rights Issues Recede." Special article by Joe Cochrane to The Washington Post.
In the run-up to President Bush's visit to Indonesia this week, two dozen members of a fundamentalist Islamic group raided and occupied a historic botanical garden in the mountain town of Bogor, outside Jakarta. Their target was the site where a construction crew was building a landing pad for Bush's helicopter. Their message was simple: Bush was not welcome in the world's largest Muslim-majority country.
Within 30 minutes, hammers were pounding again and the cement mixer had resumed turning, but as a media event, the gimmick briefly worked. Other, little-known Muslim groups began protesting Bush's visit and were given blanket coverage by local news outlets. Senior members of Indonesia's parliament accused Bush of slaughtering Muslims worldwide and claimed his half-day visit to Bogor was part of a plot to control Indonesia's economy.
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September 02, 2006
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006, came into force on August 12, following the confluence of two related events affecting the military balance in Lebanon. First, Israeli forces in Lebanon faced formidable resistance from Hezbollah militia which stymied efforts by Israeli troops to achieve outright and immediate military victory. For its part, the Hezbollah leadership realized that stalemating Israeli military might had its political costs in terms of political acceptance among other Lebanese religious and communal groups. The suffering of life and property of Lebanon by Israeli ground and air forces, which had been offset by admiration for Hezbollah from across the Lebanese communities, began to take its political toll.
Israeli Prime minister Ehud Olmert came in for fierce criticism for the handling of the military campaign launched July 12. The chief of the Israeli defence force was criticised for relying too much on air power. But the underlying reason for the less than commendable performance of the Israeli ground forces seem to be more sociological than military tactics: the bulk of the Israeli reservists who were called for duty came from a new generation of professionals in the management, service and information service sectors. Unlike previous generation of Israeli soldiers, who were more hardy and tribulation-tested men and women coming from the harsher farms and rural areas, the new generation soldiers had less training and field experience to face the guerrilla-cum-rocket technology type warfare adapted by Hezbollah.
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August 07, 2006
The crisis in the Lebanon is already a month old since Israeli forces entered south Lebanon in search of two of its soldiers abducted by Hizbullah, the Shite-based and Iran-backed militia, following an Israeli corporal who was initially taken as prisoner in late May.
A flurry of meetings in the capitals of the Middle East, Europe, the United Nations, North America and even Asia took place to find a “ceasefire”, “cessation of hostilities” and other diplomatic formulations that usually are banded around, each hoping against hope that “international concern” and “pressure of public opinion” will bring some degree of “stability” to what is essentially a tense, complex and difficult military situation on the ground.
In late July, the European Union floated the idea of a “multinational force” consisting of France, Italy, Norway and Turkey which would constitute “a robust force” to bring about some kind of military stand-off . Heads of states and of governments in Arab capitals differ in their approaches to seek a solution, depending on the respective Arab government’s strategic attitudes toward Israel, Lebanon and Iran. The UN in New York issued its predictable litany of diplomatic statements, underlining its helplessness in having credible leverage over any of the protagonists. The US Secretary of State rather awkwardly wanted “a ceasefire in days, not weeks” but found her words undercut by intensified shelling and missile attacks by both Israel and Hizbullah. Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the Organization of Islamic Conference called on the UN Security Council to be more assertive in condemning Israeli aggression.
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